Alberto Dalmazzo
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università
di Siena
Giancarlo Marini
Dipartimento di Economia e Istituzioni, Università
di Roma "Tor Vergata"
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 24, 2000, n.6, p.967-983
Abstract
In a model of oligopolistic competition in the banking sector, we analyse how the monetary policy rule chosen by the Central Bank can influence the incentive of banks to set high interest rates on loans over the business cycle. We exploit the basic model to investigate the potential impact of EMU implementation on collusion among banks. In particular, we consider the possible effects of the European Central Bank's policy criteria with regard to the cost of credit in national markets.
J.E.L. classification numbers: D43, E52, G21
Keywords: bank competition, implicit collusion, European Central
Bank, monetary policy
Download WP PDF (275
kb)