* A Public Choice Model
of
International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State
(with J. Macey), [Cardozo Law Review, 18, 1996, pp.401-432.] download
The rate of formal and informal
coordination
of regulation among states has been increasing despite the fact that
bureaucrats
and politicians appear to value autonomy. The article builds on a model
of international behavior where regulators would prefer to remain
wholly
autonomous, but are unable to because the firms that the regulators
want
to regulate are increasingly able to avoid domestic regulation.
Bureaucrats
who want a particular policy outcome, yet lack the political clout to
obtain
that outcome domestically can collude with regulators in other
countries
to achieve the policy outcome they prefer. Where the bureaucrats'
desired
policy outcome is enshrined in an international accord, then the
bureaucrats'
claim that the policy should be adopted has much more force. The value
of international harmony and coordination is substituted for whatever
substantive
value is reflected in the regulations.This article applies its theory
to two case studies: the
inte-national
coordination of capital adequacy requirements for banks, and the
international
coordination of insider trading regulation.