Other papers
*
"It was the
rule of law. Will it be the rule of judges?” [Revue Économique, 58 (6), Novembre 2007, pp.
1163-1180] download
The
Gregorian revolution introduced the rule of law in the West and created
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for growth to take off. This
paper
analyzes some of the consequences provoked by the evolution in the
notion of
the rule of law – from being based upon God-given natural law to
relying on
popular sovereignty. It concludes that the importance of the rule of
law, of
the differences in legal systems and of constitutions is probably
overstated.
It suggests that the successor to the medieval notion of the rule of
law is in
fact a mix of procedural political correctness, social preferences and
efficiency. As a result the main player becomes the judiciary, whose
behavioral
patterns should become the object of further analysis.
* "Early work experience and
the transition into entrepreneurship" (with A. Melnik) [The Journal of
Entrepreneurial Finance & Business Ventures, 12(1), August 2007,
pp. 9-25] download
*
"Founders and
funders: an introduction to entrepreneurship and venture capital" (with
A.
Melnik) [ICER Working Papers, 2005]
By
focusing on the economics of productive and unproductive
entrepreneurship and in particular on the mix of entrepreneurial
activities,
this paper explains the role and the presence of venture capitalism in
different institutional contexts. These
context are defined in terms of property rights, freedom of contract
and
competition.
It is
shown that venture capitalism is just one among the various
possibilities of
transforming good ideas into success stories; and that tends to be
discarded when the rules of the game
are such that transaction costs are high and less than transparent.
Although
venture capitalism tends to be positively correlated with growth, it is
not a
necessary condition for growth. But its presence can provide important
signals
as for the nature of the prevailing institutional framework and
possibly signal
unexploited opportunities to direct entrepreneurial resources toward
productive
goals.
* "Hayek
and Economic Policy (the Austrian
Road to the Third Way)", [in Alain Marciano and Jean-Michel Josselin (eds.),
Democracy, Freedom
and Coercion: a Law and Economics Approach, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
July 2007, pp. 46-66] download
By
examining Hayek’s approach to economic policy, this paper tries to show
that
his understanding of a free-market society was ambiguous, if not
contradictory.
Hayek was indeed following the Austrian tradition by rejecting
technocratic
views of policy-making. Nevertheless, he advocated a constitutional
approach
ultimately based on the rule of law created behind a veil of ignorance.
Regulation and a fairly extensive welfare state are not ruled out
either, and
are subject to evaluation through a mix of rule of law (what that
means),
public opinion, common sense.
After
close inspection of the Road to Serfdom, the Constitution of Liberty,
Law,
Legislation and Liberty this contribution concludes that not only does
Hayek
fail to provide clear answers to the fundamental questions of economic
policy.
He also advocates a Third Way characterised by enlightened social
engineering.
In particular, the state has the duty to provide a suitable framework
for the
individual to develop his action, and to meet those social needs that
the
market fails to satisfy.
*
"Law, Economics
and the
Institutional Approach to
Development and Transition: towards an Evolutionary Perspective" [Procesos de Mercado, III (1), Primavera
2006] download
The
principles underlying evolutionary psychology suggest an approach to
Law and
Economics that tends to reject top-down policy making and encourages a
bottom-up stance, whereby rules lead to behavioral routines that are
consistent
with individuals’ shared psychological patterns.
The view proposed here is
fruitful from a methodological perspective, in that it allows a new
classification of societies, new insight on their prospects for
economic
growth, an innovative appreciation of the chances for successful
transition in
areas that have undergone substantial political transformation.
*
"Is
Malinvestment enough to go bust?"[Journal of Libertarian
Studies, 19 (3), Summer 2005, pp. 3-32] download.
*
"Sulle dinamiche del
ciclo misesiano"
[in L. Infantino, N. Iannello, Ludwig von Mises: le Scienze Sociali
nella Grande Vienna, Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004, pp.87-114] download
Contrariamente alla maggior parte delle
analisi tradizionali, infatti, la visione originaria Mises non spiega
il
ciclo richiamandosi a shock esogeni o a illusioni di cui sarebbero
vittime
gruppi di agenti economici. Per contro, l'accento viene posto sul
fenomeno
dell'inflazione sequenziale generata dal sistema bancario e dalla
variazione
nei fondamentali a essa legata.
Questo contributo si inserisce nel solco austriaco, ma intende
approfondire non tanto la fase di espansione - oggetto principale
dell'analisi
misesiana - quanto i periodi di crisi e depressione, caratterizzati
dalla
dinamica dei prezzi relativi e dai suoi effetti in termini di consumo,
di produzione, di comportamenti sul mercato dei fattori. In
particolare,
si sostiene che, a seguito della crisi, l'andamento della domanda di
fattori
provoca l'acquisizione di rendite di posizione; queste spiegano il
persistere
dei periodi di crescita modesta, se non di stagnazione.
*
Book Review:
"Markets, Planning,
and
Democracy, by D. Prychitko” [Markets and Morality, 6, 1, 2003,
pp.
301-302] download.
*
"Towards a
non-Darwinian theory of
institutional
change" [Journal of Bioeconomics, 5(1), 2003, pp. 1-25]
download.
The paper emphasizes two flaws in mainstream economics: the
failure to understand actual human behavior in many real contexts and
the
belittling of transaction costs. By stressing the role of knowledge,
institutions,
transaction costs and path dependence, new institutional economics has
provided a powerful answer to these shortcomings. Nevertheless, a
number
of questions remain open. In particular, path dependence is far from
being
a continuous process. Its dynamics and its irregularities are by and
large
unexplained. Hence, a strong need for a convincing evolutionary theory
of environmental change.
This paper maintains that the natural-selection process that
characterizes the Darwinian approach is ill suited to describe economic
evolutionary processes. It is shown that a combination of functional
analysis
and natural selection may indeed be a better solution, for it solves
some
of the puzzles raised by the public choice theory without violating the
fundamental tenets of the new-institutional approach. Still, although
this
combined view may well explain why the institutional features are
retained
by the system, it does not clarify why they are introduced in the first
place.
A third possibility is put forward in the second part of the
paper, where a new evolutionary theory is suggested. Within this
framework,
agents are assumed to behave according to their preferences within the
existing rules of the game. At the same time, new ideas and sometimes
new
ideologies may influence their behavioral patterns. The combination
between
needs and ideologies generates environmental change, especially if
so-called
“ideological entrepreneurs” are able to transform latent and shared
beliefs
into an institutional project and enforce it.
* "Why is corruption
tolerated?",
[Review of Austrian Economics, 16(4), 2003, pp. 363-379] download
It is maintained that a closer analysis of the
features
of the underlying contract reveals that under many circumstances
corruption
is in fact a rational and understandable reaction to institutional
failures,
which are often far from accidental. Sometimes it can even be
considered
legitimate, when instrumental in achieving goals shared by the vast
majority
of the electorate.
To this purpose, three different stylized institutional
frameworks
are analyzed: developed, totalitarian and transition countries. The
origin,
scope and consequences of corruption vary significantly across the
different
frameworks. The normative conclusions should therefore be adjusted
accordingly.
*
“Economia : scienza inesistente?
Conversazione
autobiografica con Sergio Ricossa”, (a cura di, con R. Cubeddu), [Il
Pensiero
Economico Italiano, IX, 2001, 1, pp.187-199] download.
*
"Transformation 'West' und
Zivilgesellschaft",
[in M. Zoeller (ed.), Vom Betreuungstaat zur Buergergesellschaft, J.P.
Bachem Verlag fuer die Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung, Koeln, 2000,
pp.28-36]
download
*
"On the legitimacy of mainstream
policy-making",
[in K. Leube (ed.), Vordenker einer neuen Wirtschaftspolitik,
Frankfurter
Allgemeine Buch for the F.A. von Hayek Institut. and the IIAE, Wien,
2000,
pp.31-42] download
*
"Economia delle Fondazioni -
Un
Commento", [in L. Filippini (ed.), Economia delle Fondazioni, Il
Mulino,
Bologna, 2000, pp.239-246] download
*
"Journal articles
about
the Italian Economy, 1980-1996", with Joe C. Davis and David E.
R.
Gay [Economia Internazionale, LII, 3, Agosto 1999, pp. 317-326]
We analyze over 1900 articles about the Italian
economy published in the scholarly journals indexed by the Journal of
Economic
Literature from 1980 to 1996. We rank journals by pages devoted to the
Italian economy, and we identify changes in the popularity of research
fields such as regional and labor economics. The study concludes that
concentration
declined over the period among authors and journals.
*
"Free-market economies,
rule-of-law
and policy-making", [Ch.9 of S. Pejovich, Economic Analysis of
Institutions
and Systems (2nd edition), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998] download
This
paper analyzes the main features of
a free-market system, where uncertainty can be reduced, but not
eliminated,
and government intervention is legitimate only when it derives from a
clear
principal-agent link between policymakers and a very large majority of
the population. In particular this requires a tight constitutional
framework,
so that incumbent policy makers can be removed whenever they engage in
rent-seeking activities and violate the principal-agent contract.
This work explains why government agents usually manage to
acquire
some power, not only authority. As a consequence, free-market
principles
are violated, and individual property rights are transferred to an
extent
which goes beyond the level some individuals are willing to agree to.
Although
governments still draw their legitimacy from the people, the
principal-agent
link is weakened, and a free-market model is replaced by a mixed
economy.
Constitutional engineering may help in slowing down the involuntary
transfer
of power from the individuals to government(s), but it cannot stop it.
*
"A rent-seeking view of the ageing problem in
developed countries", [Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche, 2/3, 1996, pp.
91-112] download
This
paper considers the ageing problem
as
the outcome of the changing equilibrium between the coalitions involved
in the provision of the welfare state and of state pensions. The
situation
inherited from the past consists of an unfair deal between a relatively
small number of workers and a relatively large numbers of non-voting
youth.
It is argued that such a deal allowed social expenditure to expand at
the
expense of future workers. Future workers have now become voting
individuals
who realize that they cannot transfer the unfair deal to future
generations,
for lack of future workers supporting future pensioners. As a
consequence
present workers are bound to renegotiate the deal with present
retirees,
and confront the powerful bureaucratic coalition. Possible solutions to
this conflict are presented and discussed.